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ABSTRACT
Android users are increasingly concerned with the privacy of their
data and security of their devices. To improve the security aware-
ness of users, recent automatic techniques produce security-centric
descriptions by performing program analysis. However, the gener-
ated text does not always address users’ concerns as they are gen-
erally too technical to be understood by ordinary users. Moreover,
different users have varied linguistic preferences, which do not
match the text. Motivated by this challenge, we develop an inno-
vative scheme to help users avoid malware and privacy-breaching
apps by generating security descriptions that explain the privacy
and security related aspects of an Android app in clear and un-
derstandable terms.We implement a prototype system, PERSCRIP-
TION, to generate personalised security-centric descriptions that
automatically learn users’ security concerns and linguistic pref-
erences to produce user-oriented descriptions. We evaluate our
scheme through experiments and user studies. The results clearly
demonstrate the improvement on readability and users’ security
awareness of PERSCRIPTION’s descriptions compared to existing
description generators.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Mobile platform security;
KEYWORDS
Android; Big Five personality model; Natural language generation;
Security; Textual description
1 INTRODUCTION
With the phenomenal growth of the Android platform, there has
been a tremendous increase in security threats. The openness of
the environment attracts criminals to spread malicious apps such
as Trojan [46], Worms [28], Botnets [32] and Spyware [37]. Mali-
cious activities can lead to privilege escalation, privacy leaks, per-
sonal information theft and monetary loss [5].
To assist users in deciding whether they should install an app,
Android provides two kinds of information: requested permissions
and textual descriptions generated by app developers. It is vital
that end users understand the potential security risks andmake the
right decision (e.g., avoiding installingmalicious apps) based on the
information provided. However, it has been shown that this infor-
mation cannot effectively protect users from installing malware or
privacy-breaching apps [45]. In general, researchers have already
demonstrated that the requested permissions and textual descrip-
tions do not significantly improve security awareness of end users
[45]. Request permissions are used to declare sensitive resources
(e.g., camera, location, contacts) used by apps. This is in part be-
cause the majority of end users do not understand the currently
used technical permission terms, limiting the readability of the per-
mission lists. Hence, the provided information is limited for the
purpose of decision making. A user study shows that a substantial
number of users are unaware of the presence of the permission list
[6]. Thus, there is a high possibility that users still tend to accept
malicious app installation without having a full understanding of
security implications from the permission list. In addition, app de-
velopers usually sidestep security risks in their textual descriptions.
More importantly, variations exist between the produced texts and
the real functionality of apps. Criminals can easily craft deceptive
textual app descriptions to mislead inexperienced users. A signif-
icant deviation is also found between the requested permissions
and the provided descriptions [34].
To address the aforementioned problem, textual descriptions gen-
erated from app code analysis are considered a feasible alternative
solution. Suspicious codes are detected by performing program
analysis, and then the outcomes are transformed into human read-
able language through NLG (Natural Language Generation); exam-
ple systems in this category include DescribeMe [45], AutoPPG [3],
and Drebin [44]. Although the descriptions generated by these sys-
tems are security-centric, they are still too technical and tedious to
attract users’ attention to improve their security awareness. The
overall impact of such systems are no better than permission lists
since the descriptions are likely to be neglected by end users [6].
In this paper, we propose an innovative method that automat-
ically learns users’ security concerns and linguistic preferences
to generate personalised security-centric descriptions that can im-
prove their security awareness. We learn users’ concerns through
the ratio of the permissions that they modify deliberately. To learn
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linguistic preferences, we first classify individuals into distinct per-
sonality types based on their behaviours, and then produce corre-
sponding linguistic preferences. The NLG technique is integrated
to organise and generate personalised text that can be easily un-
derstood by users so that they can pay the necessary attention.
We implement a prototype system, PERSCRIPTION, to demon-
strate the novelty of our approach. We leverage machine learn-
ing algorithms in user personality prediction, and utilise Statisti-
cal Natural Language Generation (SNLG) to generate stylistic vari-
ations in textual descriptions for different personalities. We evalu-
ate our system using real-world Android apps from different app
markets. Experiment results and user studies demonstrate the im-
provement of our generated security descriptions compared to re-
cent approaches [3, 45] in terms of readability and increased user
awareness. It is also demonstrated that our system is efficient to
generate semantically-correct results by consuming low energy in
a short time, which is an extremely important requirement for mo-
bile devices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to de-
velop a psychologically-informed security-centric description gen-
erator for the Android platform. We leverage the Big Five person-
ality traits [10] to classify Android users according to the adoption
of different types of mobile apps. The Big Five model is exploitd in
our NLG method as human perceptions of personality variations
are delineated by the model [31]. The words associated with each
personality trait are demonstrated to represent a specific linguistic
style [21]. Some studies reveal the correlation between personality
and linguistic cues [1, 22, 30].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Wepropose an innovative method that automatically learns
users’ concerns and linguistic preferences, and generates
personalised security-centric descriptions to improve their
security awareness.
• We implement our prototype system, PERSCRIPTION, by
incorporating state-of-the-art techniques from different dis-
ciplines, such as Big Five personality traits classification,
linguistic style generation via NLG, and generating psychologically-
informed descriptions.
• Experiments results and user studies show significant im-
provement of our generated descriptions in terms of read-
ability and user awareness compared to other state-of-the-
art techniques.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the overview of PERSCRIPTION. Section 3, 4 and 5 detail three
parts of our system with a proof-of-concept respectively. Experi-
ment results are described in Section 6. We discuss the limitations
and related work in Section 7 and Section 8 respectively, and we
conclude the paper in Section 9.
2 OVERVIEW
2.1 Problem Statement
Figure 1 depicts the current methods for security description gen-
eration. Figure 1A provides an example of requested permission
list including reading phone information. The simple enumeration
does not always get users’ attention and protect users from mali-
cious app installation. The longer the enumeration list, the harder
it is to attract users’ attention. Similarly, the textual descriptions
(A) Permission Request
(B) Textual Descriptions
(C) Drebin Descriptions&
Our Personalised Descriptions
Right, ok, sending SMS messages, which 
doesn't have any security promise and 
it's the really suspicious permission at 
high risk.
Right, ok, triggering action by SMS 
messages, which doesn't have any 
security promise and it's the really 
suspicious activity at high risk.
Right, ok, communicating with external 
host, which doesn't have any security 
promise and it's the really suspicious 
networking at high risk.
Figure 1: Existing descriptions v.s. our personalised descrip-
tions before app installation.
Android App App Market
2) Original Security-centric
Description Generation
1) Publish
Mobile Behaviours
3) Input
4) Users’ Concerns & Linguistic 
Preference Learning
Personalised 
Description
5) Replace
Figure 2: Deployment of PERSCRIPTION.
are generally generated from app functionality or users’ instruc-
tions instead of users’ security concerns. An example is provided
in Figure 1B. Significant deviation is also revealed between permis-
sion lists and textual descriptions [34].
Recently, some efforts have been made in explainable detection
onmalicious Android apps [3, 44, 45]. These methods extract suspi-
cious codes by performing program analysis and craft the textual
descriptions using NLG. Consider Drebin [3] as an example (the
top part of Figure 1C), it detects the most representative features
of the malware and inserts them into several simple sentence tem-
plates as security descriptions. There is no user-centric method to
generate personalised security descriptions for different users.
To address this issue, we propose a new technique, PERSCRIP-
TION, with automatic linguistic stylistic description generation that
address users’ concerns psychologically. A sample of our person-
alised descriptions is shown at the bottom of Figure 1C. It demon-
strates a learned linguistic style for one personality dimensionwith
trained parameters from statistical models. As shown in Figure 1C,
the content of our scripts is the same as Drebin, while the advan-
tage of our descriptions is noticeable in terms of naturalness, read-
ability, and usefulness. We believe our method is more effective in
assisting users in enhancing awareness of security threats in an
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unknown app. From our experiment results, 25% more users were
aware of the threats through our descriptions compared to Drebin
[3].
The expected deployment model of our system is demonstrated
in Figure 2. After the developer publishes an app in an app market,
the original security-centric descriptions will be generated auto-
matically by performing code analysis. When a user attempts to
install the app, the user’s mobile information is obtained automati-
cally to personalise app security descriptions with specific content
and linguistic style suitable for the specific user. The personalised
descriptions are shown on mobile screens instead of the original
ones.
The aim of PERSCRIPTION is to generate personalised descrip-
tions that cater to users’ concerns. This goal is achieved as follows.
1) Security-Centric Description. Our provided descriptions are
security-centric as they are derived from the malicious patterns
(malware indicative features) detected by existing method [3]. 2)
PersonalisedDescription.The generated descriptions target users’
concerns precisely, with the related part automatically lifted to the
top in their preferred linguistic style. 3) Natural and Readable
Description. The output scripts are natural and readable with
stylistic linguistic expression to match users with different person-
alities.
2.2 Architecture Overview
Our system workflow is illustrated in Figure 3. The personalised
description generator includes the following three steps:
1) Users’ Concerns Learning. We study users’ concerns ac-
cording to their mobile permission change. Intuitively, frequent
default setting modifications indicate users’ concerns on different
permissions. For instance, if a user refuses to provide Location per-
mission for the listed apps, Location is then considered as the per-
mission user concerns. In this case, the proportion of denied apps
represents the extent of the user’s concerns about Location. Based
on the extents of different permissions, the descriptions are then
reorganised to be consistent with the sorting result.
2) Users’ Linguistic Preference Learning. To generate per-
sonalised descriptions for different users, we classify users into
different types to design unique text for each of them. The users
are characterised into different personalities based on the Big Five
Personality model [10]. Mobile behaviours (app adoption) are used
as indicators to predict their personalities using machine learning
algorithms. Linguistic preference (preferred words) for each per-
sonalty is then learned for the next step.
3) NLG-Based Context Construction. Finally, we construct
the text according to the users’ concerns and linguistic preference.
In the process, the syntactic structures are generated for malicious
information detected from an app. They are later realised as sen-
tences to be organised and aggregated into one security-centric
description. To generate scripts for different personalities of users,
Statistical Natural Language Generation (SNLG) is employed, and
a series of stylistic factors and parameters (e.g., aggregation op-
erations and pragmatic markers) are determined by learning al-
gorithms to demonstrate continuous variation in linguistic pref-
erence. For example, introverts are more likely to adopt complex
structures [21].
2.3 Baseline
As our work mainly focuses on description comprehension and re-
construction, we apply Drebin [3] as the malware detection base-
line. Drebin extracted thousands of features from app code and
manifest files such as API calls and permission request. The fea-
tures were utilised to train a malware detection model using ma-
chine learning algorithms. Representative features for malicious
apps were also learned from the training model. The features were
meaningful to provide effective descriptions to help users to con-
sider security threats.
Drebin then fed the obtained features into eight simple pre-designed
sentence templateswithout considering human readability and aware-
ness. Figure 1C (top part) presents Drebin descriptions for a mal-
ware sample. Although the malicious behaviours were accurately
detected including communication with external server and send-
ing SMSmessages, the risk of security threats was hardly perceived
by humans with the fixed-template text generation. This becomes
the motivation of our research.
3 USERS’ CONCERNS LEARNING
In this section, we learn users’ concerns from their behaviours on
app requested permissions. In total, we apply eight representative
permissions in our experiment: Location, Contacts, Calendars, Re-
minders, Photos, Bluetooth,Microphone and Camera. They are dis-
played as several individual layouts in mobile devices. Two exam-
ples (Bluetooth and Location) are shown in Figure 4. Each layout
contains an app list which requires the permission at installation
time. The green button (with checkmark) alongwith the app name
represents the access status of ‘Allow’, whereas the grey button
(with question mark) indicates ‘Deny’. In the provided examples,
all apps are allowed to access the Location. Users can modify the
status to enable (‘Allow’) or disable (‘Deny’) any app to access the
related permission after installation.
3.1 Permission Preference Learning
We learn users’ permission preferences which indicate their pri-
vacy concerns. According to the Android Document [9], app devel-
opers need to state the required permissions in <uses-permission>
elements of manifest files that users must grant to run the app cor-
rectly. Hence, the access statuses for app requested permissions
are set as ‘Allowed’ in default. Some prudent users modify them
to prevent their personal information from leaking. We access the
app list with statuses for each permission from the mobile device
and label the status as modified if it is ‘Deny’. If a user changes
the statuses substantially in some specific permissions, the permis-
sions are considered as the users’ concerns. More concretely, we
define a variable ‘Attention Level’ (a percentage ranged from 0 to
1) to represent the extent of their concerns on each permission.
Specifically, the variable is calculated as the proportion of the mod-
ified statuses in the app list for each permission. Afterwards, the
ranking of 8 permissions are generated ordered by their ’Attention
Level’.
Moreover, users’ concerns vary in different types of apps, such
that users may concern more about the permission Location on
the app ‘Google Maps’ than ‘News’. Therefore, we further classify
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Permission RankingDescription List
1.Script 1 with Permission B.
2.Script 2 with Permission B.
3.Script 3 with Permission A.
Android Descriptions (Original) Users’ Concerns Learning
Permission A
Permission B
ExtravertedAgreeable
Stable Conscientious
Open
Linguistic 
Variables
Personalised Descriptions
1.Personalised script 3 with Permission A.
2.Personalised script 1 with Permission B.
3.Personalised script 2 with Permission B.
NLG-Based Context ConstructionUsers’ Linguistic Preference Learning
Figure 3: Overview of PERSCRIPTION.
(A) Bluetooth (B) Location
Figure 4: Example permission layouts for (A) Bluetooth and
(B) Location.
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Figure 5: Users’ Attention Levels in different app categories:
(A) Social and (B) Productivity. The box represents the At-
tention Level distribution in 36 participants from our user
study in Section 3.3. Red lines presents the medians. Data
points beyond the whiskers are displayed using ‘+’.
apps into eight categories (Audio, Game, Image, Maps, News, Pro-
ductivity, Social and Video) according to Android Document [9].
We learn a user’s concerns in each category separately to provide
the specific permission ranking based on the category of the app
to be installed. Figure 5 shows a example of users’ Attention Lev-
els distributed on eight permissions for two app categories: Social
Location Contacts Calenders Reminders Photos Bluetooth Microphone Camera
Permission
0
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0.6
0.8
1
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n 
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Figure 6: Attention Level distribution on different permis-
sions.
and Productivity. It is indicated that permission rankings can be
different on different categories.
Algorithm1 demonstrates our permission ranking generation at
app installation time. The inputs of the algorithm are the targeted
category of the app to be installed, the set of installed apps and the
applied eight permissions. The first step is to traverse all installed
apps to select those in the targeted category and add them into a
specific group. If the user has not installed any app in the mobile
before, the default ranking is providedwhich is the statistical result
from other users. If there are no installed apps in the targeted cate-
gory, the remaining apps are applied in filling the group. The pro-
portion of the modified settings in the specific app list is computed
to represent the Attention Level for each permission separately. Fi-
nally, the permissions are sorted accordingly in descending order.
3.2 Description Reconstruction
The descriptions from Drebin [3] are reconstructed based on the
permission rankings. As the permissions indicate users’ privacy
concerns, we reorder the sentences conforming to the rankings.
For example, if the permission Location is ranked first, the related
descriptions will be lifted to the top. The purpose of the design is to
attract users’ attention to the security threats when they attempt
to download a new app. The order of the generated sentences is
important, because most users only spend a moment to read the
top part of the text. If they are attracted at a glance, it is more likely
for them to read the rest and further realise the serious security
risks from the app.
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Algorithm 1 Permission Ranking Generation at App Installation
Input: cate : the category of the app to be installed, Setapp : a set
of installed apps, Setper : a set of permissions
Output: Rper : permission rankings for the app to be installed
1: Rper = ∅;
2: Setspecapp = ∅;
3: if Exist(Setapp ) then
4: Setspecapp← {app ∈ cate};
5: else
6: return de f aultRankinд;
7: end if
8: if !Exist(Setspecapp) then
9: Setspecapp ← Setapp ;
10: end if
11: Rper ← {GetAttentionLevel(Setspecapp ∈ Setper });
12: Sort(Rper );
13: return Rper ;
Table 1: Big Five dimensions with six specific facets [25].
E A C N O
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness
Gregariousness Trust Competence Anxiety Ideas
Assertiveness Dutifulness Order Angry hostility Fantasy
Activity Altruism Dutifulness Depression Aesthetics
Excitement-seeking Compliance Achievement striving Self-consciousness Actions
Positive emotions Modesty Self-discipline Impulsiveness Feelings
Warmth Trust Deliberation Vulnerability Values
3.3 Proof-of-Concept: Part I
3.3.1 Data Collection. We conduct a user study to collect real-
world user permission settings. Before we start, we obtained ap-
proval of our submitted full ethics application from the Human
Ethics Advisory Groups. We selected mobile users as our target
group, and randomly targeted pedestrians at different places such
as universities or shopping centres. The collection process is chal-
lenging. Some people are concerned about privacy leak by provid-
ing such private information, even with our promise of confiden-
tiality protection. In addition, each participant is required to give
the full app lists along with the associated eight permissions. In
total, we obtained valid information from 36 volunteers. To guar-
antee the correctness, we asked them to capture snapshots contain-
ing required permission settings and send the pictures to us. We
further manually classify the apps from the pictures into defined
categories and record the settings for them (i.e., Allow or Deny).
3.3.2 User Permission Analysis. It is depicted in Figure 6 that a
user’s concerns on different permissions vary greatly. We calculate
the ratio of the apps with setting change in the whole list to repre-
sent their concern levels for each permission. Figure 6 shows the
distribution of concern levels for all participants. It can be found
that the level of concerns on Location is the highest among the
users, and the level ranges around 62% to nearly 100%. On the
contrary, the concern levels for all the remaining permissions are
lower than 25%. It is indicated that most individuals fail to consider
the risks in three permissions: Calendars, Reminders and Bluetooth.
4 USERS’ LINGUISTIC PREFERENCES
LEARNING
To learn linguistic variation for different users, we first build a clas-
sifier to predict user traits. We then study the distinct linguistic
preferences in each trait including text organisation and pragmatic
markers.
4.1 Big Five Personality Trait
The Big Five model [10] is widely accepted in psychology to pre-
cisely address users’ personality. We therefore use it as a bridge
between users’ mobile behaviours and linguistic preferences. As
shown in Table 1, the Big Five personality traits include Extraver-
sion (E), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), Neuroticism
(N) and Openness (O). The six facets that define each dimension
[25] are also listed in the table. For instance, people in extraver-
sion are found to be more talkative, outgoing, active and sociable
compared to other dimensions.
A classic measurement, Big Five Inventory (BFI), is used to iden-
tify users’ personality traits in Big Five dimensions [10]. BFI con-
tains 44 questions, and each of them demonstrates a representative
characteristic. To complete the questionnaire, users are required to
rate each characteristic on a sliding scale, where 1 represents Dis-
agree Strongly and 5 represents Agree Strongly. The overall scores
in the five dimensions are calculated according to the scoring in-
structions [10], and each dimension is calculated using the sum of
scores with its related questions. It is indicated from prior studies
[4, 43] that there is no standard way to determine whether the di-
mension score is high or low. To solve this issue, we borrow the
result of a reliable user study including more than 70,000 individu-
als [24]. Each dimension is labelled as high or low according to the
comparison between calculated score and the corresponding mean
value from the result. There exists a variation on the mean values
in male and female. Hence, demographics information is also re-
quired to determine the labels for ground truth data. However, the
studies [17, 43] demonstrate the shortage of dichotomizing quanti-
tative variables, and the fact that only a small percentage of people
perform as high or low in each personality trait. Therefore, we em-
ploy three groups (High, Medium, Low) to label participants in five
traits separately.
4.2 Personality Trait Classifier
We generate a learning-based algorithm to predict users’ person-
ality traits from their mobile behaviours (app adoption in differ-
ent categories). Inspired by prior studies [36, 43], we apply the in-
formation on mobile app adoption, more specifically, the numbers
of installed apps on the eight different categories listed in Section
3.1. An extra category is added for undefined apps. It is worth not-
ing that pre-installed (default) apps in mobile devices are excluded
in our experiment as they are not indicative of a user’s person-
ality. We use these features since they are readily accessible and
are proved to be useful indicators in previous data-driven studies
[36, 43]. We mainly focus on ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups prediction
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Figure 7: The layouts of our designed survey app. The left
part is about demographics, and the right part consists of
BFI 44 questions [10].
in each personality trait, as people in those groups behave differ-
ently [43]. In total, we generate ten models to predict the iden-
tified groups simultaneously. A series of machine learning algo-
rithms are employed such as Random Forest, Decision Tree, SVM
and Naive Bayes [8].
4.2.1 Data Collection. We design a questionnaire in two ver-
sions to collect real-world user information, including demograph-
ics, BFI 44 questions, and app adoption behaviours (excluding pre-
installed apps). One version is an online questionnaire which re-
quests participants to input their information manually. However,
counting app numbers in several different categories is error-prone.
Therefore, we develop another Android survey app to count those
numbers automatically in the background. The snapshots of the
app are depicted in Figure 7. The demographics and BFI questions
are designed separately into the two layouts in the figure. The
quantity of apps in each category is retrieved by Android API and
sent to our server automatically along with the input of two lay-
outs. The app is published in the Android app market for partici-
pants to download. As the functionality of returning app category
is only supported in Android 5.0 (API level 21) and higher, we keep
both versions of the questionnaire in our experiment.
We publish the links of our questionnaire in two separate ver-
sions on the Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform [2]. We
only recruit participants with a ‘Masters Qualification’, which is
a performance measure defined by MTurk and is strictly granted
to high-performance workers by MTurk. Each participant is re-
warded 0.5 dollar for completing the questionnaire. We also re-
quire them to provide a survey code which is only generated af-
ter the questionnaire is completed for data validation. In total, we
obtained 587 responses. We further manually removed five invalid
responses submitted in a short time or with multiple duplicate an-
swers. From the demographics statistics, we found all of the par-
ticipants are adults (18 years of age or older), with gender balance
(52.7% Male and 47.3% Female). We label the data according to the
standard explained in Section 4.1. It is found that for each trait,
around half of the participants belong to the group ’Medium’, while
the other two groups account for about a quarter of the partici-
pants respectively.
E-High A-High C-High N-High O-High
(A) Precision of Big Five traits predicted as High
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E-Low A-Low C-Low N-Low O-Low
(B) Precision of Big Five traits predicted as Low
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Figure 8: Precision of randommodels and our models in Big
Five traits prediction as (A) High and (B) Low.
4.2.2 Evaluation. We evaluate the performance of our model,
and further compare the result with a random model. Intuitively,
the model randomly assigns a group to each user in five traits in-
dependently. In comparison, we train and test several algorithms
and select the one with the best performance as our model. We
achieve ten predictive models based on the process. Each model
is named using a target group, such that ‘E-High’ represents the
model to predict the users perform as high in Extraversion. The
performance is measured using Precision, which is the proportion
of the participants who are correctly allocated in each target group.
We only apply Precision to measure the prediction performance on
the target group, since other measurements such as Accuracy can
only provide overall performance on both groups.
The comparison results between our 10 models and the random
models are demonstrated in Figure 8, with two sets of five-trait
predictive models in group (A) ‘High’ and (B) ‘Low’. The Preci-
sion of our models is higher than randommodels, the difference is
most significant on bothmodels of C (Conscientiousness), where it
achieves approximately 40% improvement. Other models can also
increase Precision by about 15% on average. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of our model is comparable to prior similar studies [42, 43].
4.3 Personality Trait and Linguistic Preference.
We further study the linguistic preference for predicted personality
traits. An example of adjectives associated with each trait is shown
in Table 2 from the prior psychological study [19]. We accordingly
design different lexical choices with recognisable linguistic varia-
tion. For instance, extravert people are likely to use more positive
emotion words compared to introvert ones. A detailed model for
personalised descriptions generation is explained in section 5.
4.4 Proof-of-Concept: Part II
We analyse the correlations between the features (app categories)
and target groups (‘High’ and ‘Low’ in five traits). Figure 9 depicts
Pearson correlation coefficients for pairs of features and groups,
which are represented by the grayscale of the blocks. Dark blocks
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Table 2: Example adjectives corresponding to high or low
level in Big Five traits [19].
Trait High Low
E warm, sociable, active shy, quiet, passive
A calm, peaceful, confident neurotic, anxious, depressed
C trustworthy, considerate, helpful selfish, suspicious, malicious
N competent, disciplined, dutiful disorganised, impulsive, forgetful
O creative, curious, cultured conservative, ignorant, simple
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Figure 9: Correlations between users’ app adoption in differ-
ent categories and their Big Five Personality traits in group
‘High’ or ‘Low’.
indicate positive correlations, while light blocks indicate negative
correlations. For instance, according to the figure, users in group
‘C-Low’ (‘Low’ group of Conscientiousness) are more likely to in-
stall apps in Video, News and Map. Similarly, app adoption on
Game, Audio, Video and Image can denote a user in group ‘N-High’
(‘High’ group of Neuroticism). In contrast, agreeable and conscien-
tious users are in low possibility of adopting Map apps as well as
the users in group ‘E-Low’ and ‘N-Low’ (‘Low’ groups of Conscien-
tiousness and Neuroticism). The negative correlation also appears
when conscientious users adopt Video apps.
5 NLG-BASED CONTEXT CONSTRUCTION
We apply a statistical model to estimate linguistic parameters to
generate different syntactic templates and transform them into security-
centric descriptions for different personality traits.
5.1 Syntactic Structure Generation
Syntactic structures for different personality traits are generated
based on a SNLG (Statistical Natural Language Generation) model.
We leverage 67 parameters [18] in syntactic structure identifica-
tion which are explained in Table 3. The parameters are estimated
by several statistical models such as SVM [19]. The kernel of the
method is implemented using generic lexical resources including
WordNet [26]. This provides a potential to create various personality-
focused text with different kinds of content plans. Hence, we have
adopted the model for security description generation based on
personality traits.
As our research goal is to improve the security awareness of
end users, we utilised the model to generate utterance-based app
descriptions which are more natural and expressive than simple
plain-sentence descriptions (e.g., ‘Err... sending SMS messages is
suspicious.’ v.s. ‘App sends SMS messages.’). We keep the kernel of
the model with input of our target content and calculated person-
ality score. The content is collected and organised from Drebin [3]
results. More specifically, we generate all malware-indicative fea-
tures from their dataset including 5,560 malicious apps in the real
world. Those features are then classified into several categories
such as permission, according to their functionality and triggered
condition. Each feature is interpreted to be a subject in one descrip-
tion according to corresponding pre-defined explanations in An-
droid Document [9]. Take ‘SEND_SMS’ as an example, it is trans-
formed as ‘sending SMS messages’ to insert into related scripts.
The category is defined as subject type, and is likely to appear in
a designed sentence (e.g., The permission is suspicious). After re-
trieval from Android Document [9], it is discovered that the cate-
gories cover all possible features for current apps. Therefore, our
method is comprehensive in description generation for both known
and unknown malicious apps.
5.2 Sentence Organisation and Aggregation
SentenceOrganisation.Weconstruct the syntactic templates and
convert them into text with a series of linguistic parameters. Differ-
ent from previous works [3, 45], we applied Deep Syntactic Struc-
tures (DSyntS) [23] to generate syntactic templates. DSyntS are
syntactic representations demonstrating various linguistic frame-
works. Two example SyntS are shown in Figure 10. In the process,
language for description generation is learned through multiple
rule-based steps, and transformed text for semantics is modelled
systematically. DSyntS produce attributes for sentence construc-
tion, such as object name (e.g., sending SMS messages) and object
type (e.g., permission). RealPro surface realiser [13] is employed to
interpret DSyntS into text representation.
As shown in the second part of Table 3, three parameters are
selected to determine syntactic templates: self-reference, complex-
ity and polarity. Figure 10 depicts two DSyntS examples describ-
ing the permission ‘sending SMS messages’. It is depicted in Fig-
ure 10A that the sentence is realised in two versions: basic and
extended (with dashed-line branches) templates. The structure is
determined by a user’s personality. The introvert is found to pre-
fer complex structure. The extended templates are provided for
this group since they contain complex syntactic with a subordinate
clause. For example, self-reference is related to the groups of ‘High’
in Extraversion and Neuroticism. The extended template performs
higher in self-reference parameter, with one first person pronoun
compared to the lack of the pronoun in the basic template. The
last parameter polarity characterises the syntactic as positive or
negative. Both templates in the example exhibit the same polarity,
which can be decreased by replacing ‘is’ with ‘could be’ in original
sentences.
Sentence Aggregation. After syntactic templates are gener-
ated, we further aggregate the templates to include all content
and realise the combined DSyntS to one app description. Aggrega-
tion operations are determined by Aggregation parameters which
are listed in the third part of Table 3. We explain how we adopt
the parameters as follow. Sibling propositions from the content
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Table 3: The 67 parameters learned to determine specific syntactic structure, proposed from previous work [18].
Parameters Descriptions
Content parameters:
VERBOSITY Control the number of propositions in the utterance
RESTATEMENTS Paraphrase an existing proposition
REPETITIONS Repeat an existing proposition
CONTENT POLARITY Control the polarity of the propositions expressed, i.e. referring to negative or positive attributes
REPETITIONS POLARITY Control the polarity of the restated propositions
CONCESSIONS Emphasise one attribute over another
CONCESSIONS POLARITY Determine whether positive or negative attributes are emphasised
POLARISATION Control whether the expressed polarity is neutral or extreme
POSITIVE CONTENT FIRST Determine whether positive propositions-including the claim-are uttered first
Syntactic template selection parameters:
SELF-REFERENCES Control the number of first person pronouns
CLAIM COMPLEXITY Control the syntactic complexity (syntactic embedding)
CLAIM POLARITY Control the connotation of the claim, i.e. whether positive or negative affect is expressed
Aggregation operations:
PERIOD Leave two propositions in their own sentences
RELATIVE CLAUSE Aggregate propositions with a relative clause
WITH CUE WORD Aggregate propositions using with
CONJUNCTION Join two propositions using a conjunction, or a comma if more than two propositions
MERGE Merge the subject and verb of two propositions
ALSO CUE WORD Join two propositions using also
CONTRAST - CUE WORD Contrast two propositions using while, but, however, on the other hand
JUSTIFY - CUE WORD Justify a proposition using because, since, so
CONCEDE - CUE WORD Concede a proposition using although, even if, but/though
MERGE WITH COMMA Restate a proposition by repeating only the object
CONJ. WITH ELLIPSIS Restate a proposition after replacing its object by an ellipsis
Pragmatic markers:
SUBJECT IMPLICITNESS Make the permission implicit by moving the attribute to the subject
NEGATION Negate a verb by replacing its modifier by its antonym
SOFTENER HEDGES Insert syntactic elements (sort of, kind of, somewhat, quite, around, rather, I think that, it seems that, it seems to me that) to mitigate the
strength of a proposition, e.g., ‘It seems to me that sending SMS messages doesn’t have security promise.’
EMPHASIZER HEDGES Insert syntactic elements (really, basically, actually, just) to strengthen a proposition, e.g., ‘Basically, sending SMS messages doesn’t have
security promise.’
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Insert an initial back-channel (yeah, right, ok, I see, oh, well)
FILLED PAUSES Insert syntactic elements expressing hesitancy (like, I mean, err, mmhm, you know)
EXCLAMATION Insert an exclamation mark
EXPLETIVES Insert a swear word
NEAR-EXPLETIVES Insert a near-swear word
COMPETENCE MITIGATION Express the speaker’s negative appraisal of the hearer’s request
TAG QUESTION Insert a tag question
STUTTERING Duplicate the first letters of a permission’s name
CONFIRMATION Begin the utterance with a confirmation of the restaurant’s name
INITIAL REJECTION Begin the utterance with a mild rejection, e.g., ‘I’m not sure’
IN-GROUP MARKER Refer to the hearer as a member of the same social group, e.g., pal, mate and buddy
PRONOMINALIZATION Replace occurrences of the permission’s name by pronouns
Lexical choice parameters:
LEXICAL FREQUENCY Control the average frequency of use of each content word, according to BNC frequency counts
WORD LENGTH Control the average number of letters of each content word
VERB STRENGTH Control the strength of the selected verbs, e.g., ‘I would suggest’ vs. ‘I would recommend’
are linked with expression of rhetorical relation through clause-
combining operation. For instance, the propositions ‘prevalent per-
mission’ and ‘at high security risk’ are contrasted, so they are com-
bined with cue words like ‘however’ or ‘but’. The operation terms
are selected based on possibility distribution of relation corpus,
which is learned from personality parameters. The associated pairs
of propositions in children nodes are aggregated by all possible
clause-combining operations traversal. To achieve this, the SPARKY
clause-combining operations [39] are applied for representing rhetor-
ical relations, as shown in Table 4. Take ‘MERGE’ as an example,
it is used when the main verb for two DSyntS is same. An exam-
ple result of ‘WITH CUE WORD’ is ‘Sending SMS messages is the
suspicious permission, with no security promise’.
Pragmatic makers do not contribute to syntactic structure, but
instead, they play an important role in personalising sentences
with pragmatic effects. We manually assign syntactic variables for
themarkers collected and combine themwith the handcrafted data-
base [19]. Insertion points are detected by traversing all DSyntS,
and markers are inserted correspondingly. Figure 10B gives an ex-
ample to explain the insertion process. The root node is an inser-
tion point which matches the syntactic pattern of the marker ‘I
mean’, so the branch is inserted under the root node (dashed lines).
The attributes are specified below the lexemes, such that Position
variable indicates the marker added at the start of the sentence.
Adopted pragmatic markers are described in the fourth part of
Table 3. The insertion process contains a random selection from
syntactic patterns in pragmatic markers and matching with aggre-
gated DSyntS. As the extravert is more likely to use implicit words,
SUBJECT IMPLICITNESS parameters are assigned for the group.
This can lead to the transformation from ‘Sending SMS messages
is the suspicious permission’ to ‘the permission is suspicious’.
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be
Class: verb
I
Sending SMS messages
Class: proper noun
II
permission
Class: noun
ATTR
suspicious
Class: adjective
ATTR
mean
Class: noun
Punct: between comas
Position: sentence start
I
<Pronoun>
Number: singular
Person: 1st
(B) (I mean,) S(s)ending SMS
messages is suspicious permission.
be
Class: verb
I
Sending SMS messages
Class: proper noun
II
permission
Class: noun
ATTR
suspicious
Class: adjective
(A) (I suggest) S(s)ending SMS
messages is suspicious permission.
<Pronoun>
Number: singular
Person: 1st
I ATTR
suggest
Class: verb
Figure 10: Two example DSyntS for our security-centric descriptions. Bold text represents lexemes and variables below rep-
resent assigned attributes for RealPro at generation time. I and II indicate subject and object separately, while ATTR means
modifier.
Table 4: Clause combining operations for different rhetori-
cal relations [39, 40].
RST relation Aggregation operations
justify with cue word, relative clause, so cue word, be-
cause cue word, since cue word, period
contrast merge, however cue word, while cue word, con-
junction, but cue word, on the other hand cue
word, period
infer merge, with cue word, relative clause, also cue
word, conjunction, period
concede even if cue word, although cue word,
but/though cue word
restate conjunction, merge with comma, object ellipsis
5.3 Proof-of-Concept: Part III
The different linguistic stylistic variations are presented in Table
5. Given the content, the descriptions are generated automatically
according to specific personality pattern. We adjust different input
parameters to produce several sentences describing one content
(sending SMS messages). Each time we select two dimensions and
set values to high or low separately, with neutral values for the
other traits. The linguistic diversity is noticeable in different traits
of users even when conveying the same meaning. For instance, an
exclamation mark is applied to project high extraversion. In con-
trast, the pause ‘Err’ indicates intraversion as well as low agree-
ableness, which is also expressed by negative propositions. Open-
ness to experience is related to some special words, such as ‘damn’
(group ‘High’) and ‘bloody (group ‘Low’)’ in this example.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Semantics Correctness Checking
We evaluate the semantics correctness by the similarity calculation
between Drebin descriptions and our descriptions. To obtain the
score, we employ three measures: Dandelion [38], ADW [33] and
LSA [12]. The scale of the score is from 0 to 1, while high percent-
age indicates high similarity. We apply four distinct personalised
descriptions to compute their similarities with Drebin description
based on the same feature (sending SMS messages). The similar-
ity scores are listed at the top part of Table 6, and all of them are
higher than 70%. Furthermore, our descriptions perform best simi-
larities, the scores of them achieve up to 83%. In addition, syntactic
similarities are also evaluated, as shown at the bottom of Table 6.
It is revealed that the main content of the sentences is not mod-
ified while using different linguistic styles with only around 55%
syntactic similarities.
6.2 Readability Score
To evaluate the readability of our generated descriptions, we lever-
age the readability score based on four indices [11]: FKGL (Flesch
Kincaid Reading Ease), GFS (Gunning Fog Score), SMOG (SMOG
Index) and ARI (Automated Readability Index). High score means
the text is easily readable, and vice versa.We applymalware-indicative
features used by Drebin (Figure 1C), and for each of them, we gen-
erate four descriptions with different personality input in compar-
ison to the original description provided by Drebin. As depicted
in Figure 11, each subplot represents a feature, in which 1 repre-
sents the Drebin description and Case 1-4 represent our four de-
scriptions. It can be found that our descriptions consistently per-
forms better than Drebin in readability regardless of which index
is adopted. The score increase is most noticeable when using FKGL,
which reaches to almost 20 in Figure 11C.
6.3 Readability and Awareness Checking
We further evaluate the readability and measure the awareness im-
provement in real practice. We develop an Android app includ-
ing personality test (the right layout of Figure 7) and scenario-
simulated test. Participants are provided with an Android mobile
phone with our test app installed. Firstly, participants are asked
to complete a personality test in the app. Once the test is finished,
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Table 5: Example personalised descriptions with different personality traits. H represents group ‘High’, and L represents group
‘Low’ in individual dimension. The blank indicates the neutral values between H and L.
E A C N O Descriptions
H H Imean, sending SMS messages doesn’t have any security promise and this request is like, the suspicious permission at high risk!
H H Sending SMS messages is at high risk. It’s the suspicious permission. This permission doesn’t have any security promise.
L H Sending SMS messages is at high risk. Err... basically, it’s the damn suspicious permission. This permission doesn’t have any
security promise, does it?
L L Sending SMS messages doesn’t have any security promise, does it? Err... it is the suspicious permission.
L L Err... sending SMS messages is the suspicious permission. It’s kind of at high risk.
L L Err... sending SMS messages is at high risk. It’s the bloody suspicious permission. This permission doesn’t have any security
promise, does it?
FKGL GFS SMOG ARI
(A) PERMISSION: SEND_SMS
0
5
10
15
R
ea
da
bi
lity
 S
co
re
FKGL GFS SMOG ARI
(B) INTENT: SMS_RECEIVED
0
5
10
15
FKGL GFS SMOG ARI
(C) NETWORK: lebar.gicp.net
0
5
10
15
20
Drebin Case1 Case2 Case3 Case4
Figure 11: Readability scores for Drebin description and our descriptions (Case 1-4) for three example features: (A) Permission,
(B) Intent and (C) Network. We randomly select four typical personality types: Case1 (neutral values on five dimensions (E,
A, C, N, O), Case2 (high values on E and C, others are neutrals), Case3 (low values on E and A, others are neutrals) and Case4
(high values on E and A, others are neutrals). Four readability indices [11] are applied: FKGL (Flesch Kincaid Reading Ease),
GFS (Gunning Fog Score), SMOG (SMOG Index) and ARI (Automated Readability Index).
Table 6: Semantic and syntactic similarities between Drebin
description and our 4 descriptions (D1-D4).
Measures D1 D2 D3 D4
Semantic
Dandelion 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
ADW 0.80 0.72 0.74 0.76
LSA 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.73
Syntactic Dandelion 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.53
the user’s personality type is identified. Participants are then re-
quired to download apps through our simulation platform, which
is similar to the process of users are browsing and downloading
apps on Google Play. After participants click the download button,
a page including security descriptions is presented before installa-
tion. We provide three typical types of security descriptions on our
simulation platform, including our two personalised descriptions
as well as Drebin [3] description. Our descriptions are based on the
personality of each participant, where one accords with the partic-
ipant’s personality while the other is opposite. After participants
make their decisions, our app requires participants to summarise
the security descriptions and provide reasons if they choose not
to download the app. In our experiment, the security description
is regarded as readable, if participants are able to correctly sum-
marise the security descriptions. The improvement of awareness
is considered as true only if participants choose not to install the
app and give the reason as ‘security problem’.
Before we start the experiment, we carried out a pilot study to
confirm all the questions included in our experiment are all mean-
ingful and explicitly expressed. Based on the pilot study, we im-
proved our experiment from the following aspects. Participants are
required to download a certain type of Android apps to avoid the
impact of their preferences on some specific types.Our app utilises
similar interfaces of Google Play, positioning participants in a real
app installation. We also avoid other security or any risk related
hints during the experiment, to ensure that the security aware-
ness only comes from the descriptions we generated. We adjust
the logical order of the page processing in our test app to achieve
user-friendly interaction.
In total, we invited 38 participants, and among all the partici-
pants, only 2 participants guessed our research objectives during
the experiment. It indicates that apart from these 2 participants,
rather than being potentially influenced by our research objectives,
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the rest of participants perform naturally by following their own
instincts and their daily behaviours of downloading apps. Besides,
we found that education background is a critical impact factor in
our experiment. We invited 12 students who major in IT security,
the result indicates that only one of them chose to install the app
with the security descriptions. The reason was that he regarded
the app as a low risk and it was acceptable to obtain its benefit.
Since our descriptions are designed for ordinary users, and the ma-
jority of them do not have related knowledge, we excluded those
IT students from our experiment. Therefore, only remaining 24 re-
sponses are regarded as valid.
From our experiment, the readability of our personalised de-
scriptions which accord with participants’ personalities achieved
the best result with 79.2% participants correctly summarised the
main idea of the descriptions, followed by the descriptions oppo-
site to participants’ personalities, and the percentage is 66.7%. In
comparison, the readability of the description from Drebin only
reached 41.7%. In terms of security awareness improvement, our
descriptions also achieved better result than Drebin description.
The descriptions accordingwith participants’ personalities achieved
54.2%. In contrast, Drebin only achieved 29.2%.
6.4 System Efficiency Checking
We evaluate our system efficiency based on runtime performance
of randomly selected 150 apps from the Google Play Store. Our
system contains four parts: Drebin detection model [3], permis-
sion ranking, personality classifier and NLG model. While the test-
ing experiments run fast, the training process is time consuming.
Fortunately, model training is one-time effort, and is generally fin-
ished offline before use. Three models involved are trained on a
PC (2.7 GHz Inter Core i5 with 8GB 1867 MHz DDR3). Drebin [3]
model is generated in 63 minutes including the app analysis time,
with their whole dataset consisting of 131,611 apps. In contrast,
the processes in personality classifier and NLG model are more ef-
ficient, completed in 5 seconds and 18 minutes respectively with
586 responses and 8 sets containing 545,334 potentially suspicious
features from detection model training result.
We test the four parts individually on the PC, and we further run
the complete app on two Android smartphones (Nexus 5 and Pixel
XL). The size of the apps we collect is ranged from around 50 KB to
5MB. The average testing time on PC for an app is around 1,475ms
(700 ms, 370 ms, 150 ms and 255 ms for four parts respectively).
The whole process costs less than 2 seconds per app including file
analysis (about 280 ms). The result is comparable to DescribeMe
[45], with average runtime in 391.5 seconds. We further tested the
prototype in two smartphones, and both of them achieved the re-
sults in 10 seconds.
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Dependence of Detection Accuracy.
PERSCRIPTION is implemented based on the malware detection
method from Drebin [3]. Since all of our generated descriptions
originate from trained malware indicative features, the detection
performance considerably contributes to the explanation correct-
ness. Although the classifier was evaluated to outperform existing
methods and anti-virus scanners, there is still room to improve the
detection rate. As suspicious apps are evolving rapidly, detection
model is required to update frequently.
7.2 Dependence of Personality Judgement.
The linguistic preference and syntactic structure are generated ac-
cording to judged personality traits. Although the Big Fivemodel is
a widely accepted measurement to distinguish human personality,
it is still challenging to identify a user trait exactly in five dimen-
sions. Moreover, there may exist improvement in our personality
predictive model based on user app adoption. Some features may
be more personality indicative and thus have the potential to im-
prove the model accuracy such as sensitive information such as
SMSmessage length or content. However, we do not consider those
features in our automatic system because they are not readily ac-
cessible. In practice, from the investigation of our user study, users
tend to protect their private information from external access.
7.3 Dependence of NLG Performance.
Unlike the traditional sentence template, our personalised descrip-
tions are generated automatically with NLG technique. Currently,
our work employs the model for text generation trained by pre-
vious paper [18] which demonstrates stylistic variations in differ-
ent personality traits. While the model produces distinct generic
linguistic preference to improve text readability, more generation
styles may be considered to target users’ security concerns. Some
technical words in descriptionsmay also be interpreted for compre-
hension towards average users. Moreover, when evaluating users’
security awareness improvement, we also provided participants
with the descriptions opposite to their personalities. The result
(50%) is not significantly worse compared to the descriptions ac-
cording with their personalities (54.2%). This can result from the
small sample size of the participants. More importantly, we pro-
vided participants with several descriptions for the same content,
once the first description is presented, they may get preconcep-
tions on the content. This can influence their decisions with the
remaining descriptions. We may leverage some experiments from
psychology area to avoid the impact for future work.
8 RELATED WORK
Android App Description Generation. A series of efforts have
been made to generate descriptions for Android apps. WHYPER
[29] was the first to utilise Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques to explain permission requests. AutoCog [34] further
related textual descriptions with permission list via NLP and ma-
chine learning algorithms, and exposed lowdescription-to-permission
fidelity. Therefore, later studies generate descriptions from the ma-
licious behaviours detected by code analysis. DescribeMe [45] anal-
ysed internal program logics and translated security-sensitive code
patterns into natural language scripts. Similarly, AutoPPG [44] per-
forms static analysis and achieved app behaviours about user per-
sonal information to generate privacy policy. Drebin [3] employed
learning-based algorithms to identity indicative patterns for mal-
ware, which were embedded into constructed sentence templates.
Compared with them, PERSCRIPTION mainly focuses on security
awareness improvement for end users, with personalised descrip-
tions to aid risk assessment psychologically.
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Users’ Concerns Learning. Prior works studied users’ con-
cerns from different angles. Adrienne et al. indicated that users’
attention can be reflected from user views which provided privacy-
related warning [6]. Some studies [7, 27, 41] focused on learning
users’ adoption of location-based services and their concerns which
was the permission users concerned most from our study result.
Later, Jialu et al. applied hierarchical clustering with an agglom-
erative approach to cluster user’s privacy preferences on mobile
app [14]. Bin et al. characterised the concerns with a hierarchy of
three privacy levels [16]. Bin et al. proposed a method to learn pri-
vacy profiles from permission settings to assist users with further
configuration [15]. As a comparison, we leveraged users’ privacy
concerns from the amount of apps they changed default settings
instead of the status ‘Allow’. We found the modification behaviour
was more indicative for users’ concerns and used to re-organise
the order of our security-centric app descriptions.
User Trait and Linguistic Preference. Correlations are re-
vealed from prior studies among mobile behaviours, user traits,
and linguistic preference. Suranga et al. [36] predicted user traits
according to the list of app installed and achieved above 90% pre-
cision. Another similar predictive model with high precision was
proposed to classify users into Big Five personality traits [10] with
the indicators of mobile app adoption [43]. Moreover, Big Five per-
sonality traits are widely accepted in psychology and demonstrate
linguistic variation [22, 35]. François et al. conducted a series of
studies to present the stylistic linguistic variation in different per-
sonality traits and further produce a language generator with con-
tinuous stylistic dimensions [19–21]. Inspired by these works, we
combine twomodels to automatically provide personalised descrip-
tions with users’ linguistic preference according to the information
from app installation.
9 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we propose an innovative method to automatically
generate security-centric psychologically-informed description by
learning users’ concerns and linguistic preference. The implemented
system, PERSCRIPTION, is evaluated to outperform existing de-
scription generators. Experiment results and a further user study
demonstrate that our generated text is more readable and more
comprehensive to cater users’ attentions and concerns. And also,
the system can output semantics-correct descriptive text in a cou-
ple of seconds. Therefore, PERSCRITION is effective in security
awareness improvement and aiding risk assessment for end users.
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